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When people talk to each other, they oftenmake arm and handmovements that accompany
what they say.These manual movements, called “co-speech gestures,” can convey mean-
ing by way of their interaction with the oral message. Another class of manual gestures,
called “emblematic gestures” or “emblems,” also conveys meaning, but in contrast to co-
speech gestures, they can do so directly and independent of speech. There is currently
signiﬁcant interest in the behavioral and biological relationships between action and lan-
guage. Since co-speech gestures are actions that rely on spoken language, and emblems
convey meaning to the effect that they can sometimes substitute for speech, these actions
may be important, and potentially informative, examples of language–motor interactions.
Researchers have recently been examining how the brain processes these actions. The
current results of this work do not yet give a clear understanding of gesture processing at
the neural level. For the most part, however, it seems that two complimentary sets of brain
areas respond when people see gestures, reﬂecting their role in disambiguating meaning.
These include areas thought to be important for understanding actions and areas ordinarily
related to processing language. The shared and distinct responses across these two sets
of areas during communication are just beginning to emerge. In this review, we talk about
the ways that the brain responds when people see gestures, how these responses relate
to brain activity when people process language, and how these might relate in normal,
everyday communication.
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INTRODUCTION
People use a variety of movements to communicate. Perhaps
most familiar are the movements of the lips, mouth, tongue, and
other speech articulators. However, people also perform co-speech
gestures. These are arm and hand movements used to express
information that accompanies and extends what is said. Behav-
ioral research shows that co-speech gestures contribute meaning
to a spoken message (Kendon, 1994; McNeill, 2005; Feyereisen,
2006;Goldin-Meadow,2006;Hostetter, 2011).Observers integrate
these gestures with ongoing speech, possibly in an automatic way
(Kelly et al., 2004;Wu and Coulson, 2005). In contrast, people also
use what are called emblematic gestures, or emblems. These are
hand movements that can convey meaning directly, independent
of speech (Ekman and Friesen, 1969; Goldin-Meadow, 2003). A
familiar example is when someone gives a“thumbs-up” to indicate
agreement or a job well done. Emblems characteristically present a
conventional visual form that conveys a speciﬁc symbolicmeaning,
similar in effect to saying a short phrase like“Good job!”Still, both
co-speech gestures and emblems are fundamentally hand actions.
This is important because people encounter many types of hand
actions that serve other goals and do not convey any symbolic
meaning, e.g., grasping a cup. Thus, in perceiving hand actions,
people routinely discern the actions’ function and purpose. As
this applies to understanding co-speech gestures and emblems,
people must register both their manual action information and
their symbolic content. It is not yet clear how the brain recon-
ciles these manual and symbolic features. Recent research on the
neurobiology involved in gesture processing implicates a variety
of responses. Among these, there are responses that differentially
index action and symbolic information processing. However, a
characteristic response proﬁle has yet to emerge. In what follows,
we review this recent research, assess its ﬁndings in the context
of the neural processing of actions and symbolic meanings, and
discuss their interrelationships. We then evaluate the approaches
used in prior work that has examined gesture processing. Finally,
we conclude by suggesting directions for future study.
Although they are often considered uniformly, manual ges-
tures can be classiﬁed in distinct ways. One way is by whether
or not a gesture accompanies speech. Another is by the degree to
which a gesture contributes meaning in its own right or in con-
junction with speech. That is, manual gestures can differ in the
nature of the semantic information they convey and the degree to
which they rely on spoken language for their meaning. For exam-
ple, deictic gestures provide referential information, such as when
a person points to indicate “over there” and specify a location.
Another class, called beat gestures, provide rhythm or empha-
sis by matching downward hand strokes with spoken intonations
(McNeill, 1992). Neither deictic nor beat gestures supply semantic
information in typical adult communication. In contrast, there are
iconic and metaphoric gestures. These provide semantic meaning
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that either complements what is said or provides information that
does not otherwise come across in the verbal message (McNeill,
2005). Iconic and metaphoric gestures must be understood in
the context of speech. For example, when a person moves their
hand in a rolling motion, this can depict wheels turning as an
iconic gesture in the context of “The wheels are turning.” How-
ever, in the metaphoric use of “The meeting went on and on,” the
same movement can represent prolonged continuation. In other
words, the speech that accompanies these gestures is key to their
representational meaning.
Because gestures vary in the way they provide meaning, the
relation between gestures and language is a complex, but interest-
ing, topic. One view is that gestures and spoken language – at both
psychological and biological levels of analysis – share the same
communication system and are two complementary expressions
of the same thought processes (McNeill, 1992). Many ﬁndings
support this proposal (Cassell et al., 1999; Kelly et al., 1999; Wu
and Coulson, 2005; Bernardis and Gentilucci, 2006). For exam-
ple, Cassell et al. (1999) found that when people retell a narrative
that was presented to them using gestures that do not match the
spoken content, their retelling takes into account both the spoken
and mismatched gesture information. The relation of gesture to
speech is strong enough that their retelling may even include new
events that resolve the conﬂicting speech and gestures. Moreover,
another study found that when an actor pointed to an open screen
door and said “The ﬂies are out” people were much more likely
to correctly understand the intended meaning (here, to close the
door) when both speech and gesture were present than if only one
or the other was given (Kelly et al., 1999). Thus, the way that peo-
ple interpret a message is constrained when gestures and speech
interact.
What are the neurobiological implications of this view that
speech and gestures share a common system? There is, in fact,
some neural evidence that gestures may evoke responses in brain
areas that are also active when people comprehend semantic infor-
mation in language. Yet, gestures are hand actions. Thus, it is also
important to recognize the neural function associated with per-
ceiving hand actions, regardless of these actions’ purpose. In other
words, there is a need to reconcile the neurobiology of action
understanding with the neurobiology of understanding semantic
information.
Prior research (described in detail below) suggests that the
neural circuits involved in action understanding primarily include
parts of the inferior parietal, premotor, posterior lateral tempo-
ral, and inferior frontal cortices. Interestingly, some of these brain
areas, particularly in the lateral temporal and inferior frontal cor-
tices, also respond to information conveyed in language. However,
it is not known if these responses depend on the modality (e.g.,
language) by which this information is conveyed. Thus, this prior
work leaves a number of open questions. For example, it remains
unclear whether brain responses to gestures are primarily driven
by the gestures’ recognition as hand actions. In other words, it is
uncertain whether some brain responses simply reﬂect sensitiv-
ity to perceiving hand actions in general, or if such responses are
more tuned to the communicative information that some gestures
convey. This would contrast with responses to hand actions that
do not directly communicate meaning, such as grasping an object.
Also, as gestures can communicatemeaning, it remains to be deter-
mined if the meaning they convey is processed in a similar way as
when meaning is presented in other forms, such as language. An
even more basic issue is that it remains unclear whether there is a
typical response proﬁle for gestures, in general.
In the following sections, we ﬁrst survey the prior research
on how the brain processes manual actions, in general (Relevant
brain responses in processing gestures). In two parts, we next review
work on brain responses to gestures that communicate meaning,
including emblems and co-speech gestures.Wehighlight areas that
might respond regardless of a hand action’s use in communicating
meaning (Perceiving hand actions: Inferior parietal and premotor
cortex). We then focus on brain areas thought to be important
for processing meaning in language (Perceiving meaningful hand
actions: Inferior frontal and lateral temporal cortex).
RELEVANT BRAIN RESPONSES IN PROCESSING GESTURES
People routinely perceive and understand others’ hand move-
ments. However, it is not yet clear how the brain processes such
information. This is very important for understanding how ges-
tures are recognized, since gestures are fundamentally arm and
hand movements. One of the most signiﬁcant ﬁndings to offer
insight into a potential neural mechanism of action perception is
the discovery of mirror neurons in the macaque brain. These are
neurons that characteristically ﬁre both when an animal performs
a purposeful action and when it sees another do the same or sim-
ilar act. For example, these neurons ﬁre when the monkey sees
an experimenter grasp a piece of food. They stop ﬁring when the
food is moved toward the monkey. Then, they ﬁre again when the
monkey itself grasps the food. In other words, these neurons ﬁre in
response to speciﬁc motor acts as each is perceived and performed.
Mirror neurons were ﬁrst found in the macaque premotor area F5
(di Pellegrino et al., 1992) and later in inferior parietal area PF
(Fogassi et al., 1998). Given that area F5 receives its main parietal
input from anterior PF (Geyer et al., 2000; Schmahmann et al.,
2007; Petrides and Pandya, 2009), this circuit is thought to be a
“parieto-frontal system that translates sensory information about
a particular action into a representation of that act” (Rizzolatti
et al., 1996; Fabbri-Destro and Rizzolatti, 2008). This is impor-
tant because it suggests a possible a neural mechanism that would
allow an “immediate, not cognitively mediated, understanding of
that motor behavior” (Fabbri-Destro and Rizzolatti, 2008).
The suggestion that a “mirror mechanism” mediates action
understanding in monkeys inspired attempts to try to identify
a similar mechanism in humans (Rizzolatti et al., 1996, 2002; Riz-
zolatti and Craighero, 2004; Fabbri-Destro and Rizzolatti, 2008;
Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2008). This effort began with fMRI
studies that examined brain responses when people observed
grasping. Results demonstrated signiﬁcant activity in premotor
cortex (Buccino et al., 2001; Grezes et al., 2003; Shmuelof and
Zohary, 2005, 2006), as well as parietal areas such as the intra-
parietal sulcus (IPS; Buccino et al., 2001, 2004; Grezes et al., 2003;
Shmuelof and Zohary, 2005, 2006) and inferior parietal lobe. This
also includes the supramarginal gyrus (SMG), which is thought
to have some homology with monkey area PF (Perani et al., 2001;
Buccino et al., 2004; Shmuelof and Zohary, 2005, 2006). For exam-
ple, Buccino et al. (2001) found that when one person sees another
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grasp a cup with their hand, bite an apple with their mouth, and
push a pedal with their foot, not only is there parietal and pre-
motor activity, but this activity is somatotopically organized in
these areas, similar to the motor cortex homunculus (Buccino
et al., 2001). Many studies (Decety et al., 1997; Grezes et al., 2003;
Lui et al., 2008; Villarreal et al., 2008) ﬁnd that these areas also
respond when people view pantomimed actions like hammering,
cutting, sawing, or using a lighter (Villarreal et al., 2008). This is
particularly interesting because, with the object physically absent,
it suggests that these areas respond to the action per se rather than
to the object or to the immediate context. Furthermore, damage
to these parietal and premotor areas results in damage to or loss
of people’s ability to produce and recognize these types of actions
(Leiguarda and Marsden, 2000). However, these ﬁndings do not
clarify whether such responses generalize to hand action obser-
vation, or, instead, are speciﬁc to observing actions that involve
object use. In other words,would these same areas also play a func-
tional role in understanding actions that are used to communicate
meaning?
In addressing this question, several authors suggest that such
a mirror mechanism might also be the basis for how the brain
processes emblems and co-speech gestures (Skipper et al., 2007;
Willems et al., 2007;Holle et al., 2008).However, the results needed
to support this are not yet established. In particular, it is not clear
whether observing a gesture systematically elicits parieto-frontal
brain responses. This would be expected if a mirror mechanism
based in these areas’ function was integral in gesture recognition.
A further unresolved issue concerns whether these meaningful
gestures elicit brain responses that are characteristically dissocia-
ble from what is found when people see hand actions that are not
symbolic, such as grasping an object. These outstanding issues are
considered in the following sections.
PERCEIVING HAND ACTIONS: INFERIOR PARIETAL AND PREMOTOR
CORTEX
For parietal and premotor regions, their consistent (or inconsis-
tent) reported involvement in gesture processing is illustrated in
Figure 1. This includes results for processing emblems, co-speech
gestures, hand movements that occur with speech but are unre-
lated to the spoken content, and grasping (see Appendix for the
list of studies from which data was used to comprise the Figures).
These ﬁndings most often implicate the ventral premotor cortex
(PMv) and SMG as active in perceiving gestures. It is important to
remember, however, that gestures can also communicate meaning.
To this end, interpreting meaning (most commonly in language)
is often linked to brain activity in lateral temporal and inferior
frontal regions. Further below, we will address these lateral tem-
poral and inferior frontal regions for their potential roles in gesture
processing. Here, we examine parietal and premotor results.
There is evidence that parietal and premotor regions thought to
be important in a putative human mirror mechanism respond not
just when people view object-directed actions like grasping, but to
gestures, as well. Numerous co-speech gesture (Holle et al., 2008,
2010; Dick et al., 2009; Green et al., 2009; Hubbard et al., 2009;
Kircher et al., 2009; Skipper et al., 2009) and emblem (Nakamura
et al., 2004; Lotze et al., 2006; Montgomery et al., 2007; Villarreal
FIGURE 1 | Parietal and premotor regions relating hand action
perception. Abbreviations: SMG, supramarginal gyrus; IPS, intraparietal
sulcus; SP, superior parietal; PMv, ventral premotor; PMd, dorsal premotor;
IFGOp, pars opercularis.
et al., 2008) studies ﬁnd inferior parietal lobule activity. More pre-
cisely, the SMG and IPS are often implicated. For example, Skipper
et al. (2009) found signiﬁcant SMG responses when people viewed
a mix of iconic, deictic, and metaphoric gestures accompanying a
spoken story. In this task, the SMG also exhibited strong effective
connectivity with premotor cortices (Skipper et al., 2007, 2009).
Bilateral SMG activity is found when people view emblems, as well
(Nakamura et al., 2004; Montgomery et al., 2007; Villarreal et al.,
2008). However, the laterality of SMG effects is not consistent. For
example, one study found an effect for the left SMG, but not the
right SMG, when people viewed emblems (Lotze et al., 2006). The
opposite was found when people saw gestures mismatched with
accompanying speech (Green et al., 2009). That is, the effect was
identiﬁed in the right SMG, not the left.
Both Green et al. (2009) and Willems et al. (2007) suggest that
the IPS shows sensitivity when there is incongruence between
gestures and speech (e.g., when a person hears “hit” and sees a
“writing”gesture).However, these two studies ﬁnd results in oppo-
site hemispheres: Willems et al. (2007) identify the left IPS and
Green et al. (2009) report the right IPS. Right IPS activity is also
found to be stronger when people see a person make grooming
or scratching movements with the hands (“adaptor movements”)
than when they see co-speech gestures (Holle et al., 2008). Another
study, however, fails to replicate this ﬁnding (Dick et al., 2009). The
right IPS is also active when people view beat gestures performed
without speech (Hubbard et al., 2009). IPS activity is found in
emblem studies, as well. But there is again inconsistency across
reports. Whereas one study found bilateral IPS activity for pro-
cessing emblems (Villarreal et al., 2008), others did not report any
activity (Lotze et al., 2006; Montgomery et al., 2007). This lack
of consistent IPS activity in results for co-speech and emblematic
gesture processing is in contrast with results for grasping. That
is, results for grasping observation consistently implicate this area.
This suggests that the IPS might not play a strong role in interpret-
ing an action’s represented meaning per se. Rather, IPS responses
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maybemore tuned in processing a hand action’s visuomotor prop-
erties. That is, when the focus of the presented information is the
hand action, itself, (e.g., in observing grasping or beat gestures
without accompanying speech) the IPS responds prominently.
This would be the case also when a gesture is incongruent with
accompanying speech. In this scenario, as an observer tries to rec-
oncile divergent spoken and manual information, a more detailed
processing of the hand action may be required. In contrast, when
speech and gestures are congruent, processing the represented
meaning, rather than the features of its expression, may be the
observer’s focus. In such a situation, IPS responses may not be as
strong as those of other regions that are more particularly tuned
toward interpreting meaning.
Premotor areas are also active when people view gestures. A
number of studies report signiﬁcant bilateral premotor responses
to emblems (Nakamura et al., 2004; Montgomery et al., 2007; Vil-
larreal et al., 2008). Some evidence also suggests similar premotor
activity for co-speech gesture observation. For example, there is
signiﬁcant bilateral PMv activity when people view metaphoric
gestures compared to when they view a ﬁxation cross (Kircher
et al., 2009), as well as bilateral PMd activity when they view
beat gestures compared to when they watch a still body (Hub-
bard et al., 2009). These ventral and dorsal distinctions are also
found in other studies. Speciﬁcally, whereas one study found PMd
activity for emblem observation (Villarreal et al., 2008), another
found activity localized to PMv, bordering the part of the inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) that also shows sensitivity to emblems (Lotze
et al., 2006).
Some research suggests that premotor responses are sensitive to
the semantic contribution of gesture. Willems et al. (2007) found
left PMv activity to be modulated by the semantic congruency
between gestures and speech: left PMv responses were stronger
to gestures that were unrelated to what was said compared to
when they were congruent. Another study found a similar result
with gestures incongruent with a spoken homonym. However, this
result implicated both left and right PMv cortex (Holle et al., 2008).
Finally, Skipper et al. (2009) found that the BOLD signal from
bilateral PMv showed a systematic response when people viewed
iconic, deictic, and metaphoric gestures during audiovisual story
comprehension.
Overall, these ﬁndings indicate that parietal and premotor
regions are generally activewhenpeople view gestures,both as they
accompany speech (co-speech gestures) and when they convey
meaning without speech (emblems). Yet, parietal and premotor
areas do not regularly respond in a way that indicates they are
tuned speciﬁcally to whether or not the gestures convey mean-
ing. Three primary lines of reasoning support this conclusion: (1)
These areas are similarly active when people view non-symbolic
actions like grasping as when they view meaningful gestures; (2)
Responses in these areas do not appear to systematically dis-
tinguish between emblems and co-speech gestures, even though
the former directly communicate meaning and the latter rely on
speech; and (3) While some ﬁndings indicate stronger responses
when a gesture does not match accompanying speech than when it
does, such ﬁndings are not consistent across reports. It seems more
likely that these parietal and premotor areas function more gener-
ally. That is, their responses may be evident when people view any
purposeful hand action, rather than a speciﬁc type of hand action.
In contrast, areas responsive to the meaning conveyed by these
actions are more likely those thought to relate to language under-
standing, i.e., areas of the inferior frontal and lateral temporal
cortices.
PERCEIVING MEANINGFUL HAND ACTIONS: INFERIOR FRONTAL AND
LATERAL TEMPORAL CORTEX
When people see co-speech gestures with associated speech, the
gestures contribute to the message’s meaning and how it is inter-
preted (McNeill, 1992, 2005; Kendon, 1994; Goldin-Meadow,
2006). Emblems also communicate meaning. However, in con-
trast to co-speech gestures, they can do so directly, independent
of speech. Emblems can even sometimes be used to substitute for
speech (Goldin-Meadow, 1999). In fact, emblems also elicit event-
related potentials comparable to those found for words (Gunter
and Bach, 2004). Only recently, however, have researchers started
studying how the brain processes these gestures. So far, the liter-
ature suggests both overlap and inconsistency as to which brain
regions are particularly important for their processing. The varia-
tion in reportedﬁndingsmaybe due tonumerous possible sources.
For example,one sourcemaybe the differing paradigms and analy-
sismethodologies used to derive results.Anothermay be the extent
of results that are given exposition. Also, the way that people inter-
pret these actions may, itself, be highly variable at the neural level.
Here, we highlight both the overlapping and varying ﬁndings in
the gesture literature for regions in the inferior frontal and lateral
temporal cortices that may be prominent in processing symbolic
meaning.
Brain areas typically associated with language function also
respond when people perceive gestures. This is consistent with
psychological theories of gesture that propose gesture and lan-
guage are two ways of expression by a single communication
system (McNeill, 1992). In Figure 2,we illustrate the consistency of
reported inferior frontal and lateral temporal region involvement
in gesture processing. This again includes results for emblems, co-
speech gestures, hand movements that occur with speech but are
unrelated to the spoken content, and, for consistency with the pre-
vious ﬁgure, grasping (see Appendix for the studies that were used
to make the ﬁgure). This ﬁgure highlights a number of areas that
may be especially important in gesture processing, speciﬁcally with
respect to processing the meanings they express.
The pars triangularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFGTr) is
one area thought to be important for interpreting meaning com-
municated in language that might play a similar role in gesture
processing. As it relates to language function, the IFGTr has been
proposed to be involved in semantic retrieval and control processes
when people interpret sentences and narratives (Thompson-Schill
et al., 1997; Thompson-Schill, 2003). The IFGTr is consistently
found to be active when people make overt semantic decisions in
language tasks (Binder et al., 1997; Friederici et al., 2000; Devlin
et al., 2003). A number of ﬁndings suggest this area also responds
when interpreting a gesture’s meaning.
The IFGTr may play a similar role in recognizing meaning
from gestures as it does in verbal language. For example, bilat-
eral IFGTr activity is stronger when people see co-speech gestures
than when they process speech without gesture (Kircher et al.,
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FIGURE 2 | Inferior frontal and lateral temporal regions relating gesture
meaning. Abbreviations: MTGp, posterior middle temporal gyrus; STGp,
posterior superior temporal gyrus; STGa, anterior superior temporal gyrus;
IFGTr, pars triangularis; IFGOp, pars opercularis.
2009).Another study found greater left IFGTr activitywhenpeople
observed incongruent speech and gestures than congruent (e.g., a
speaker performed a“writing”gesture but said“hit”;Willems et al.,
2007). However, under similar conditions in other studies – when
hand movements that accompany speech are unrelated to the spo-
ken content – activity has been found to be greater in the right
IFGTr (Dick et al., 2009), or in both right and left IFGTr (Green
et al., 2009; Straube et al., 2009). With emblems, not all studies
report IFGTr activity. In those that do, though, it is found bilater-
ally (Lotze et al., 2006;Villarreal et al., 2008). Considered together,
these results suggest that IFGTr may function similarly when peo-
ple process gestures as it does when people process language.
That is, IFGTr responses may be tuned to interpreting semantic
information, particularly when it is necessary to unify a meaning
expressed in multiple forms (e.g., via gesture and speech). When a
gesture’s meaning does not match speech, there is a strong IFGTr
response. This may reﬂect added processing needed to reconcile
a dominant meaning from mismatched speech and gesture. In
contrast, when gesture and speech are congruent, understanding
a message’s meaning is more straightforward. This would rely less
on regions that are particularly important for reconciling meaning
from multiple representations.
Posterior to IFGTr, the pars opercularis (IFGOp) has also been
found to respond when people process gestures. Anatomically
positioned between IFGTr and PMv, IFGOp function has been
associated with both language and motor processes. For exam-
ple, this region is sensitive to audiovisual speech (Miller and
D’Esposito, 2005; Hasson et al., 2007) and speech accompanied by
gestures (Dick et al., 2009; Green et al., 2009; Kircher et al., 2009),
as well as mouth and hand actions without any verbal communi-
cation (for review, see Binkofski and Buccino, 2004; Rizzolatti and
Craighero,2004). In otherwords, this area has a role in a number of
language and motor functions. This includes comprehending ver-
bal and motor information from both the mouth and the hands.
Also, left frontoparietal lesions that involve the left IFG have been
linked to impaired action recognition. Such impairment includes
even when patients are asked to recognize an action via sounds
typically associated with the action (Pazzaglia et al., 2008a,b). Put
simply, the IFGOp exhibits sensitivity in response to many types
of information. Such broad sensitivity suggests the IFGOp as a site
where integrative processes may be important in its function.
Yet, the inferior frontal cortex functions within a broader net-
work. During language comprehension, this area interacts with
lateral temporal cortex via the extreme capsule and uncinate fas-
ciculus ﬁber pathways (Schmahmann et al., 2007; Petrides and
Pandya, 2009), and potentially with posterior superior temporal
cortex via the superior longitudinal fasciculus (Catani et al., 2005;
Glasser and Rilling, 2008). fMRI studies have described strong
functional connectivity between inferior frontal and lateral tem-
poral areas in the human brain (Homae et al., 2003; Duffau et al.,
2005; Mechelli et al., 2005; Skipper et al., 2007; Saur et al., 2008;
Warren et al., 2009; Xiang et al., 2010). The lateral temporal cor-
tex also responds stronger to speech with accompanying gestures
than to speech alone. In particular, the posterior superior tempo-
ral sulcus (STSp) exhibits responses to visual motion, especially
when it is biologically relevant (Bonda et al., 1996; Beauchamp
et al., 2002). This also applies when people perceive gestures. But
according to Holle et al. (2008), responses in STSp show sensi-
tivity beyond just perceiving biological motion. They report that
left STSp is more active when people see co-speech gestures than
when they see speech with adaptor movements (such as adjust-
ing the cuff of a shirt). In a subsequent study, Holle et al. (2010)
report bilateral STSp activation when people see iconic co-speech
gestures compared to when people see speech, gestures alone, or
to audibly degraded speech. These authors posit the left STSp
as a site where “integration of iconic gestures and speech takes
place.” However, their effects are not replicated in other studies
(e.g., Willems et al., 2007, 2009; Dick et al., 2009). For example,
Dick et al. (2009) found that bilateral STSp is active both for co-
speech gestures and adaptor movements. Importantly, Dick et al.
(2009) did not ﬁnd that activity differed between co-speech ges-
tures and adaptor movements. That is, they did not ﬁnd evidence
that the STSp is responsive to the semantic content of the hand
movements. This is in line with the more recognized view that the
STSp is generally responsive to biological motion.
In contrast to STSp, posterior middle temporal gyrus (MTGp)
and anterior superior temporal cortex (STa) responses may be
tuned to interpreting meaning, including when it is conveyed in
gesture. For example, bilateral MTGp activity is stronger when
people see metaphoric (Kircher et al., 2009) or iconic (Green et al.,
2009; Willems et al., 2009) gestures than when they see either
speech or gestures alone. In response to emblems, MTGp activity
has been found in each the left (Lui et al., 2008; Villarreal et al.,
2008) and right (Nakamura et al., 2004) hemispheres, as well as
bilaterally (Lotze et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2009). Lesion studies have
also corroborated this area’s importance in recognizing an action’s
meaning (Kalenine et al., 2010). The MTGp was considered by
someauthors to bepart of visual association cortex (vonBonin and
Bailey, 1947; Mesulam, 1985). But this region’s responses to audi-
tory stimuli are also well documented (Zatorre et al., 1992; Wise
et al., 2000; Humphries et al., 2006; Hickok and Poeppel, 2007;
Gagnepain et al., 2008). Many studies have also associated MTGp
activity with recognizing word meaning (Binder et al., 1997; Chao
et al., 1999; Gold et al., 2006). Moreover, the semantic functions
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of this region might not be modality dependent (e.g., related to
verbal input). That is, the MTGp may have a role in interpreting
meaning at a conceptual level. This view aligns with the results
of a recent meta-analysis that characterizes the MTGp as “hetero-
modal cortex involved in supramodal integration and conceptual
retrieval” (Binder et al., 2009).
Many studies also implicate the STa in co-speech gesture pro-
cessing (Skipper et al., 2007, 2009; Green et al., 2009; Straube
et al., 2011). Activity in this region has been found for emblem
processing, as well (Lotze et al., 2006). Changes in effective con-
nectivity between STa and premotor cortex are found when people
view gestures during story comprehension (Skipper et al., 2007).
In language tasks, responses in this region have been associated
with processing combinatorial meaning – usually as propositional
phrases and sentences (Noppeney and Price, 2004; Humphries
et al., 2006; Lau et al., 2008; Rogalsky and Hickok, 2009). A very
similar function may be involved when people process gestures.
After all, emblems convey propositional information that is eas-
ily translated to short spoken phrases. And co-speech gestures are
typically processed in the context of sentence structures (Kircher
et al., 2009) or full narratives (Skipper et al., 2007).
It appears that parts of the inferior frontal and lateral temporal
cortices respond regardless of whether people perceive meaning
represented verbally or manually. These areas’ function suggests
a shared neural basis for interpreting speech and gestures. This
potentially shared basis is in line with the proposal that speech
and gestures use a uniﬁed communication system (McNeill, 1992).
When people must determine meaning among competing or
ambiguous representations, anterior inferior frontal responses are
most prevalent. In contrast, the MTGp responds strongly to rep-
resented meaning. In particular, this region appears to have a
role at the level of conceptual recognition. The STa also func-
tions in meaning recognition. Though it may be more important
at the propositional level. That is, STa responses appear promi-
nent when the expressed information involves units combined as
a whole (e.g., as words are combined into phrases and sentences,
or symbolic actions are associated with verbal complements).
DISTRIBUTED RESPONSES, DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS
Many reports in the gesture literature describe higher-level, com-
plex functions (e.g., semantic integration) as localized to particu-
lar brain areas. However, the brain regularly exhibits responses
that are highly distributed and specialized. These reﬂect the
brain’s dynamic functioning. Importantly, dynamic and distrib-
uted neural processes are facilitated by extensive functional con-
nectivity and interactions. In this section, we ﬁrst discuss how
specialized distributed responses may apply in gesture processing,
speciﬁcally in relation to motor system function. We then discuss
the importance of understanding the functional relationships that
facilitate cognitive processes, as these may be central in integrating
and interpreting meaning from gestures and language.
The brain regularly exhibits widely distributed and diverse sets
of responses. To more completely account for brain function in
processing gestures, the meanings gestures convey, as well as com-
munication in general, these distributed and diverse responses
must be appreciated. Such responses may, in fact, comprise differ-
ent levels of specialization that allow a functionally dynamic basis
for interpretation. One view suggests that meaning, at least as it
pertains to action information, is encoded via corollary processes
between action and language systems (Pulvermuller, 2005; Pul-
vermuller et al., 2005). This view postulates that a correlation
between action and action-related language leads to functional
links between them. These links result in this information’s encod-
ing by distributed and interactive neural ensembles. The often
cited example used to support this view is that processing effector-
speciﬁc words (e.g., kick, lick, pick) involves brain activity in areas
used to produce the effector-speciﬁc actions (e.g., with the leg,
tongue, and mouth, respectively; Hauk et al., 2004). As reviewed
above, gesture processing does, in fact, incorporate motor area
responses. Whether particular types of semantic meaning con-
veyed by gestures is represented via distinct, distributed neural
ensembles – similar to what is found for words that represent
effector-speciﬁc information – is uncertain. Conceivably, motor
responses in gesture processing could reﬂect the brain’s sensitivity
to represented features, beyond a gesture’s visuomotor properties.
In other words, gestures that symbolically represent motor infor-
mation (e.g., a gesture used to represent a speciﬁc body part, such
as the leg) could also rely on a somatotopic encoding analogous to
that found for words that represent body parts. The way that the
brain would achieve this degree of specialization is uncertain. It
is increasingly clear though that responses to gestures are, indeed,
diverse and distributed among distinct regions (Figures 1 and 2).
Yet, this view that action information is encoded via corollary
processes between action and language systems does not account
for processing meaning that does not involve action (e.g., “The
capitol is Sacramento”). Thus, while distributed encoding in the
motor system may play a part in processing information that
relates actions to the effectors used to perform actions, accounting
for how the brain interacts with meaning more generally requires
a broader basis.
Understanding how the brain interprets gestures and the infor-
mation they convey requires appreciating the way that the brain
represents information and implements higher-level functions.
This requires characterizing not just the function of distinct
locations that may show tuning to particular features, but also
the dynamic interactions and aggregate function of distributed
responses (McIntosh, 2000). Certain brain areas (e.g., in sensory
and motor cortices) may be specialized to respond to particular
kinds of information. But higher-level processes, such as memory
and language (and by extension, interpreting meaning), require
understanding the way that the brain relates and integrates infor-
mation. Most of the previously discussed studies, particularly
those focused on co-speech gestures, have aimed to characterize
the neural integration of gesture and language processing. Many
localize this process with results for sets of individual regions.
Some of the implicated regions include the IFG (Willems et al.,
2007; Straube et al., 2009), temporo-occipital junction (Green
et al., 2009), and STSp (Holle et al., 2008, 2010). However, to char-
acterize complex, integrative functions by one-to-one alliances
with individual regions, without also acknowledging those neural
mechanisms that might enable relationships among particular
regions, loses sight of the brain’s dynamic and interconnected
nature. For example, the same brain areas may exhibit activity in
different tasks or in response to similar information from different
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mediums (e.g., each symbolic gestures and spoken language; Xu
et al., 2009). Similarly, the brain can exhibit distributed function
that is evoked by presentation from the same medium (e.g., co-
speech gestures). Thus, whereas a particular brain area may be
similarly active across what seem to be different cognitive tasks,
what “distinguishes [these] tasks is the pattern of spatiotempo-
ral activity and interactivity more than the participation of any
particular region” (McIntosh, 2000). Some previous gesture work
has examined the functional relationships among anatomically
diverse areas’ responses (e.g., Skipper et al., 2009; Willems et al.,
2009; Xu et al., 2009).However, such analyses are still the exception
in the gesture literature. A more global perspective that recognizes
specialized responses interact across the whole brain to imple-
ment cognitive processes is needed. That is, whereas one neural
system might be particularly tuned to process gestures, another
might be better tuned to process verbal discourse. Importantly,
while such systems may organize with varying degrees of special-
ization, it is their dense interconnectivity that enables dynamic
neural processing in context. This may be especially important for
understanding the way that the brain functions in the perceptually
rich and complex scenarios that comprise typical experience. Thus,
to understand the way the brain implements complex processes,
such as integrating and interpreting meaning from gestures and
language, “considering activity of the entire brain rather than
individual regions” (McIntosh, 2000) is vital.
RELEVANCE FOR REAL WORLD INTERACTIONS (BEYOND THE
EXPERIMENT)
To understand a gesture, an observer must relate multiple pieces
of information. For example, emblem comprehension involves
visually perceiving the gesture, as well as processing its meaning.
Similarly, interpreting co-speech gestures requires visual percep-
tion of the gesture. But, in contrast with emblems, co-speech
gesture processing involves associating the action with accom-
panying auditory verbal information. Importantly, speech and
gesture information do not combine in an additive way. Rather,
these sources interactively contribute meaning, as people inte-
grate them into a uniﬁed message (Kelly et al., 1999; Bernardis
and Gentilucci, 2006; Gentilucci et al., 2006). There is also prag-
matic information that is part of the natural context in which
these actions are typically experienced. This pragmatic context can
also inﬂuence a gesture’s interpretation (Kelly et al., 1999, 2007).
Another factor that can impact interpretation is the observer’s
intent. For example, brain responses to the same gestures can dif-
fer depending on whether an observer’s goal is to recognize the
hand as meaningful or, categorically, as simply a hand (Nakamura
et al., 2004). Therefore, to comprehensively appreciate the way
that the brain processes gestures – particularly, the meaning they
express – these diverse information sources should be accounted
for in ways that recognize contextual inﬂuences.
However, most fMRI studies of gesture processing present
participants with stimuli that have little or no resemblance to any-
thing they would encounter outside of the experiment. Of course,
researchers do this with the intention of isolating brain responses
to a speciﬁc feature or function of interest by controlling for all
other factors. Some examples in prior gesture studies include hav-
ing the person performing the gestures cloaked in all black (Holle
et al., 2008), allowing only the actor’s hand to be visible through
a screen (Montgomery et al., 2007), and putting a large circle that
changes colors on the actor’s chest (Kircher et al., 2009). Such
unusual visual information could pose a number of problems.
Most concerning is that it could distract attention from the visual
information that is relevant and of interest (e.g., the gestures). The
inverse is also possible, however. That is, irregular visual materi-
als might artiﬁcially enhance attention toward the gestures. In
either case, such materials do not generalize to people’s typical
experience.
Beyond the materials’ visual aspects, many experiments have
also used conditions that are explicitly removed from familiar
experience. For example, a common approach has been to com-
pare responses to co-speech gestures with responses to speech and
gestures that do not match. The idea here is that the difference
between these conditions would reveal brain areas involved in
“integration” (itself often only loosely or not at all deﬁned). The
reasoning is that in the condition where gesture and speech are
mismatched the brain is presumed to respond to each as disso-
ciated signals. But, when gesture and speech are congruent, there
is recognition of a uniﬁed representation or message. However,
meaningless hand actions evoke a categorically different brain
response than meaningful ones (Decety et al., 1997). Thus, inter-
preting these ﬁndings can be difﬁcult. Such an approach also
brings to light an additional potential limitation: Many results
are determined by simply subtracting responses collected in one
condition from those in another condition. In other words, results
are often achieved by subtracting responses generated under expo-
sure to one input (e.g., speech) from responses to a combination
of inputs (e.g., speech and gesture). The difference in activity for
the contrast or condition of interest is then typically described as
the effect. Not only does such an approach make it difﬁcult to
characterize the interaction between speech and gesture that gives
a co-speech gesture meaning, but it also assumes each the brain
and fMRI signals are linear (which they are not; Logothetis et al.,
2001). Thus, results derived under such conditions can be hard to
interpret, particularly as to the degree towhich they informgesture
processing. They may also yield results that are hard to replicate,
even when a study explicitly tries to do so (Dick et al., 2009).
Another issue is thatmany researchers require their participants
to do motor tasks (such as pushing buttons to record behaviors)
that are accessory to the function of interest during fMRI data
collection. A number of prior gesture studies have used these tasks
(e.g., Green et al., 2009; Kircher et al., 2009). However, having par-
ticipants engage in motor behaviors while in the scanner could
potentiate responses in a confounding way. In other words, motor
responses could then be due to the motor behavior in the accessory
task, as well as interfere with potential motor responses relevant to
processing the gestures (the “motor output problem”; Small and
Nusbaum, 2004). This can be especially problematic when motor
areas are of primary interest. Thus, these accessory tasks can gen-
erate brain responses that are hard to disentangle from those that
the researchers intended to examine.
To avoid many of these potential limitations, more naturalistic
conditions need to be considered in studying gesture and language
function. One immediate concern may be that evaluating data col-
lected under contextualized, more naturalistic exposures can pose
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a challenge for commonly used fMRI analysis measures. The most
typical approach for analyzing fMRI data uses the general linear
model. This requires an a priori speciﬁed hemodynamic response
model against which the collected responses can be regressed.
Also, particularly for event-related designs, an optimized stimulus
event sequence is needed to avoid co-linearity effects that may
mask signal of interest from co-varying noise-related artifacts.
With naturalistic, continuously unfolding stimuli, meeting such
requirements is not always possible. Fortunately, many previous
authors have demonstrated approaches that achieve systematic,
informative results from data collected under more naturalistic
conditions (e.g., Zacks et al., 2001; Bartels and Zeki, 2004; Has-
son et al., 2004; Mathiak and Weber, 2006; Malinen et al., 2007;
Spiers and Maguire, 2007; Yarkoni et al., 2008; Skipper et al., 2009;
Stephens et al., 2010). The intersubject synchronization approach
used to analyze data collected while people watched segments of
“The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly” is probably the most well-
known example (Hasson et al., 2004). However, others researchers
have successfully derived informative fMRI results from data col-
lected as people comprehended naturalistic audiovisual stories
(Wilson et al., 2008; Skipper et al., 2009), read narratives (Yarkoni
et al., 2008),watched videos that presented everyday events such as
doing the dishes (Zacks et al., 2001), and had verbal communica-
tion in the scanner (Stephens et al., 2010). These achievements
are important because they demonstrate ways to gainfully use
context rather than unnaturally remove it. Considering the inter-
active, integrative, and contextual nature of gesture and language
processing – particularly in typical experience – it is essential to
consider such approaches as the study of gesture and language
moves forward.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
SUMMARY
Current ﬁndings indicate that two types of brain areas are impli-
cated when people process gestures, particularly emblems and
co-speech gestures.One set of areas comprises parietal and premo-
tor regions that are important in processing hand actions. These
areas are sensitive to both gestures and actions that are not directly
symbolic, such as grasping an object. Thus, it is likely that the
function of these parietal and premotor regions primarily involves
perceiving hand actions, rather than interpreting their meaning.
In contrast, the other set of areas includes inferior frontal and lat-
eral temporal regions. These regions are classically associated with
language processing. They may function in a similar capacity to
process symbolic meaning conveyed with gestures. While the cur-
rent data present a general consensus for these areas’ roles, the way
that the brain reconciles manual and symbolic information it is
not yet clear.
The lack of reconciliation between the neurobiology of action
understanding and that of understanding symbolic informa-
tion yields at least two prominent points concerning gesture
research. First, a characteristic response proﬁle for gesture pro-
cessing remains unspeciﬁed. That is, among results for these two
sets of areas, there is a strong degree of variability. This vari-
ability clouds whether certain regions’ responses are central in
gesture processing. It also obscures whether there are particular
sets of responses that implement the integrative and interpretive
mechanisms needed to comprehend gestures and language. Sec-
ond, there is currently minimal exposition at the neural systems
level, particularly that relates the brain’s anatomical and functional
interconnections. The variable and widely distributed responses
found in previous gesture studies suggest a broader neural per-
spective is needed. In other words, function throughout the brain
and its interconnectivity must be considered. In the ﬁnal section,
we discuss important issues for moving forward in the study of
gesture and language processing and then relate them to some
outstanding topics.
CONTEXT IS PERVASIVE
Tomove forward in understanding theway that the brain processes
gestures and language, the fundamental importance of context
must be recognized. This pertains both to experimental design
and as a principle of brain function (“neural context”; McIntosh,
2000). Here,we will ﬁrst brieﬂy summarize the importance of con-
sidering context as it relates to experimental approaches. We then
follow with a discussion of context as it relates to understanding
interactive and dynamic function across the whole brain.
Concerning the role of context in experimental design, one of
the primary hurdles in using contextualized, naturalistic materi-
als is that they do not typically satisfy the a priori requirements
of many commonly used imaging analysis methods (as discussed
above). However, systematically evaluating fMRI data collected
under contextualized, continuous exposures is achievable. Prior
imagingwork includes numerous informative results derived from
fMRI data collected under more naturalistic conditions (Zacks
et al., 2001; Bartels and Zeki, 2004; Hasson et al., 2004; Mathiak
and Weber, 2006; Malinen et al., 2007; Spiers and Maguire, 2007;
Yarkoni et al., 2008; Skipper et al., 2009; Stephens et al., 2010). Ges-
ture and language researchers should increasingly consider such
methods. Applying these methods could supplement subtractive
approaches (both in designing experimental conditions and their
analysis) that might mischaracterize the way the brain operates. In
particular, these methods might provide better insight into inte-
grative mechanisms in gesture and language processing, as they
are implemented in typical experience.
Concerning the role of context as it relates to brain function,
it is important to maintain perspective of the entire brain’s func-
tion. Gesture and language processing exempliﬁes this need, as
they incorporate responses that are not only diverse and dis-
tributed across the brain but are also interactive and intercon-
nected. In other words, recognizing that the brain is a complex
system in the formal (mathematical) sense will beneﬁt efforts
to understand gesture and language function. Accordingly, this
will necessitate investigations to focus on distributed neural sys-
tems, rather than just on localizing complex processes to individ-
ual regions. Examining the neural relationships between regions
could more comprehensively characterize gesture and language
processing. In any case, it would promote research that bet-
ter investigates those neural properties that facilitate higher-level
functions. For example, the distributed brain networks involved
in functions such as language, memory, and attention comprise
multiple pathways (Mesulam,1990)with semi-redundant and rec-
iprocal connectivity (Tononi and Sporns, 2003; Friston, 2005).
These connections may involve regions with varying degrees
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of specialization to particular information types (e.g., gesture
and/or language stimuli). Also, a particular region’s specializa-
tion may be determined, in part, by its connectivity (McIntosh,
2000). Put simply, more than one region may be engaged in a
particular function, and more than one function may engage
a particular region. It is important then to consider that “spe-
cialization is only meaningful in the context of functional inte-
gration and vice versa” (Friston, 2005). Therefore, to appreciate
how the brain implements complex operations (e.g., informa-
tion integration, interpretation), insight into neural function at
multiple levels of representation is needed. This implicates not
just the level of regional specialization (the system’s elements)
but also the anatomical and functional relationships that facil-
itate these elements’ interactive and distributed processes (their
connections).
FUNCTIONALLY INTERACTIVE AND DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS
Recognizing the importance of context – both as it relates to exper-
imental design and as a basic principle of brain function – will
allow future studies to better examine how the brain operates
through interactive and distributed function. This will encour-
age researchers to ask questions about the brain that incorporate
contextual factors, rather than artiﬁcially eliminate them. This is
important because people function in aworld that requires contin-
ual interaction with abundant, changing, and diverse information
sources. A greater degree of resemblance and relevance to the real
world can and should be incorporated into future experimental
designs. Below, we consider a few outstanding issues in the study
of gesture and language processing for which these approaches
may be especially useful.
One issue is whether the neural mechanisms involved in per-
ceiving gestures distinguish among the diverse semantic meanings
they can represent. For example, co-speech gestures can be used to
represent different types of information such as physical objects,
body parts, or abstracts ideas. It is unclear if the brain exhibits spe-
cialized responses that are particular to these meanings. Whether
or not such responses might be distributed in distinct regions is
alsouncertain.Additionally, it is unclear howdistributed responses
to gestureswould interactwith other neural systems to incorporate
contextual factors.
Another issue is to what extent pragmatics and situational fac-
tors inﬂuence how brain systems organize in processing gesture
and language information. Pragmatic knowledge does, in fact,
play a role in gesture comprehension (Kelly et al., 1999, 2007).
It is uncertain, however, to what degree certain systems, such as
the putative action understanding circuit relating parietal and pre-
motor responses, would maintain a functional role in perceiving
gestures under varying situational inﬂuences. For example, a per-
son might perceive a pointing gesture by someone yelling “Over
there!”while trying to escape a burning building. This is quite dif-
ferent, and would probably involve different neural systems, than
perceiving the same gesture and language conveyed to indicate
where the TV remote is located. Similarly, the way that neural
mechanisms coordinate as a function of the immediate verbal
context is also uncertain. Recall the example provided in the Intro-
duction of this paper: A person moving their hand in a rolling
motion can represent one thing accompanied by “The wheels
are turning” but another when accompanied by “The meeting
went on and on.” To process such information, neural mech-
anisms that enable functional interaction among responses to
the gesture and accompanying verbal content, and that dynam-
ically implement interpreting their meaning in context, would
need to be incorporated. Such interactive neural mechanisms are
currently unclear and deserve further investigation. Thus, address-
ing these issues would further inform the neural basis of gesture
processing, as well as how the brain might encode and interpret
meaning.
In conclusion, the current gesture data implicate a number
of brain areas that to differing extents index action and sym-
bolic information processing. However, the neural relationships
that provide a dynamic and interactive basis for comprehen-
sion need to be accounted for, as well. This will allow a more
complete look at the way that the brain processes gestures and
their meanings. As gesture and language research moves for-
ward, a vital factor that needs further consideration is the role
of context. The importance of context applies both to the set-
tings in which people process gesture and language information,
as well as to understanding in what way distributed and intercon-
nected responses throughout the brain facilitate this information’s
interactive comprehension.
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